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Introduction and background1
In September 2008, Lehman Brothers declared itself insolvent by filing for Chapter 11 protection 
against its creditors under US law. 
This was the biggest insolvency in 
US corporate history. The company’s 
share price fell from a peak of US$85 
to 10 cents, helping to trigger a 
global financial crisis. More than 
48,000 Hong Kong investors held 
approximately HK$20 billion in 
investments in structured products 
(known as ‘minibonds’) issued or 
guaranteed by Lehman Brothers. The 
collapse rendered their investments 
almost worthless.
Aggrieved investors sought to 
claim compensation from banks 
that had sold these products on the 
basis of alleged mis-selling practices, 
misrepresentation and fraud. Various 
existing dispute investigation and 
resolution mechanisms were, 
however, unable to deal with investor 
complaints effectively. 
Principal regulators, such as 
the Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
(HKMA) and the Securities and 
Futures Commission (SFC) could 
investigate complaints and institute 
disciplinary actions against 
intermediaries2 but lacked power 
to award compensation where 
intermediaries were found guilty of 
misconduct. The costs of litigation 
were likely to be disproportionate, 
cases might take years to conclude 
and there were the added risks of 
appeals. Given the imbalance of 
financial and emotional resources, 
it was impossible for investors to 
deal with banks on an equal footing 
in litigation. Moreover, by contrast 
with some other jurisdictions3, there 
was no provision for class actions 
in Hong Kong. Even where claims 
that did not exceed HK$50,000 
had been filed in the Small Claims 
Tribunal, adjudicators took the view 
that they were beyond the Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction because of the complex 
legal issues involved.4
The costs of litigation 
were likely to be 
disproportionate, 
cases might take years 
to conclude and there 
were the added risks 
of appeals.
The Consumer Council also 
could not assist because investors 
did not fall within the definition of 
“consumer” under the Consumer 
Council Ordinance.5
The lehman Brothers-related 
Investment Products Dispute 
Mediation and Arbitration Scheme
Thus, in October 2008, the 
HKMA appointed the Hong Kong 
International Arbitration Centre 
(HKIAC) to administer the Lehman-
Brothers-related Investment Products 
Dispute Resolution Mediation and 
Arbitration Scheme (‘the Scheme’) 
to resolve minibond claims between 
banks and investors6. The Scheme 
came into effect on 3 November 
2008.
Cases may proceed to mediation 
under the Scheme where (i) an 
investor’s complaint in relation to 
Lehman products has been referred 
by the HKMA and SFC, and (ii) the 
bank and its customer have agreed to 
go to mediation under the Scheme.
Mediation under the Scheme is a 
confidential, voluntary, non-binding 
and private resolution process in 
which a mediator helps the parties 
to reach a negotiated settlement 
or to narrow the issues in dispute. 
Opinions, proposals or offers made 
during the mediation process shall 
not be disclosed in any subsequent 
judicial or arbitral proceedings unless 
the parties or an arbitrator agree 
otherwise.7 If settlement is reached, 
the parties shall sign a settlement 
agreement, thus ending the mediation 
process8. 
If mediation is not successful, 
the parties may agree to binding 
arbitration administered by the 
HKIAC. Arbitration will then be 
conducted on a documents-only 
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basis, with an informal hearing being 
convened only if further clarifications 
of facts are considered necessary.9 
The fixed fees of the Scheme are 
normally borne equally by the parties, 
though the HKMA will bear the fees 
of qualified claimants10.
As at 18 November 2009, a total 
of 250 requests for mediation had 
been made under the Scheme.11 The 
amounts claimed ranged from some 
HK$40,000 to over HK$5 million. 
Among them, 85 cases proceeded to 
mediation, of which 75 achieved full 
settlement, a settlement rate of over 
85%.12
Evaluation of the Scheme 
To evaluate the success or otherwise 
of the Scheme, its impacts from a 
number of different perspectives must 
be comprehensively considered.
Investors
The Scheme has provided a viable 
alternative to costly and protracted 
litigation for investors in achieving 
their ultimate goal of compensation in 
the shortest time possible, even if not 
full compensation. It has significantly 
shortened the time required to resolve 
disputes compared with litigation. A 
maximum of five hours is allocated 
to mediation; no cases referred to 
arbitration shall exceed 21 calendar 
days from referral to final award13. These 
strict time limits considerably lower legal 
costs and thus make significant savings 
to investors. Mediation is a versatile 
means of dispute resolution. One of 
its advantages is that compensation is 
not limited to monetary awards; other 
creative remedies, such as an apology 
or other types of compensation ‘in 
kind’, may result from settlement 
agreements14.
Banks
The Scheme is an efficient platform 
through which banks may resolve mass 
disputes effectively and expeditiously. 
Its most direct benefit is to enable full 
and final settlement without having 
to disclose commercial sensitive 
information and thus to save the 
banks from jeopardy with respect to 
business reputation and shareholder 
confidence. Moreover, customer 
relationships can be maintained, 
thus minimising the risk of adverse 
publicity from hostile demonstrations 
or media exposés.
 
The courts
The Scheme has saved court time and 
resources. It would otherwise take 
several years to adjudicate each case, 
with the further likelihood of appeals 
delaying final conclusion.
The Scheme has 
provided a viable 
alternative to costly 
and protracted 
litigation for investors 
in achieving their 
ultimate goal of 
compensation in the 
shortest time possible, 
even if not full 
compensation.
Mediators and arbitrators 
Dispute resolvers have benefited 
greatly from the Scheme, having 
gained considerable publicity both 
in the finance industry and the 
community as a whole. It is noted 
in the Report on Lehman Brothers-
related Investment Products Dispute 
Mediation and Arbitration Scheme 
(the ‘Report’15) that, immediately 
following the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers, conventional platforms (eg 
filing claims to the HKMA and SFC, 
and in litigation) were preferred by 
investors over mediation. Reports of 
deadlocks in conventional dispute 
resolution and of the successful 
conclusion of the first mediation 
case in December 2009 led to a 
substantial increase in requests for 
mediation. This indicates that, with 
adequate promotion and public 
education, disputant parties will be 
more receptive of ADR methods. 
There is likely, in turn, to be an 
increase in work opportunities for 
dispute resolvers in the coming years.
General observations
At first sight, the Scheme has 
generated benefits all round. It has 
benefited both investors and banks 
through efficiency and certainty in 
concluding settlements, thus fulfilling 
its original purpose of providing win-
win solutions, avoiding long-term 
confrontation and pacifying investors. 
Despite the Scheme’s statistically 
high success rate, however, investors 
seem to remain aggrieved, as street 
demonstrations outside bank buildings 
in the Central district of Hong Kong 
have shown. The Scheme principally 
served to resolve disputes that arose 
from the under-regulation of sales by 
banks of particular high-risk financial 
products. Without proper government 
regulation, however, the root of 
the problem remains and a similar 
situation may arise in the future. It 
may be argued that the Scheme has 
in effect allowed defaulting banks 
to avoid legal liability by agreeing 
to compensate victims outside of 
the courts. Moreover, consumers of 
financial products in general remain 
inadequately protected without a 
well-defined unitary regulatory regime 
or a permanent external dispute 
resolution mechanism. This could be 
detrimental to Hong Kong’s image as 
an international financial centre.
Further steps: a Financial Dispute 
Resolution Centre
Following widespread complaints 
over Lehman compensation deals that 
have been dragging on for over a year 
and the existence of a regulatory gap, 
pressure arose to establish an external 
and permanent resolution mechanism 
for all financial disputes. The Finance 
Services and Treasury Bureau of the 
Hong Kong SAR therefore published 
a Consultation Paper on the Proposed 
Establishment of Investor Education 
and a Financial Dispute Resolution 
Centre (the ‘Consultation Paper’) in 
February 2010, having considered 
recommendations made by the 
HKMA and SFC in their reports to the 
Bureau of 2008.
“
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The proposed Financial Dispute 
Resolution Centre (the ‘FDRC’) is 
intended to provide an alternative 
to litigation for investors. It would 
administer a dispute resolution 
service primarily by way of mediation 
and, failing settlement, arbitration, 
thus providing a one-stop shop for 
consumers of financial services 
to resolve monetary disputes with 
intermediaries16. The model is close 
in conception to the Lehman Brothers 
Scheme. Financial institutions 
regulated or licensed by the HKMA 
or SFC would be compulsorily 
required to join the FDRC scheme as 
members. In addition, they would be 
required to enter into mediation and/
or arbitration of a monetary dispute if 
(i) the claimant so wished, and (ii) the 
dispute could not be resolved directly 
between the parties.17 The FDRC 
would not have any investigative or 
disciplinary powers. The HKMA and 
SFC, as regulators, would continue 
to deal with regulatory breaches 
whereas the FDRC would deal with 
monetary awards. The Hong Kong 
Government and the regulators would 
provide the initial set-up costs and 
operating costs for the first three years 
of the FDRC’s existence. After that, 
the operating costs would be borne 
by the financial services industry 
and, to a lesser extent, by claimant 
investors themselves.18
The need for a FDRC in Hong Kong
The proposed FDRC would no 
doubt be beneficial to Hong Kong’s 
continued strategic development 
as a competitive and dynamic 
international financial services centre 
and conducive to the Government’s 
plan “to promote Hong Kong to 
be a regional commercial dispute 
resolution centre” 19. 
With the exception of litigation, 
there is at present no permanent and 
independent mechanism in place to 
settle disputes between providers of 
financial services and consumers of 
those services. This inadequacy was 
highlighted by the HKMA as early 
as April 2001, when it published a 
comparative study report on banking 
consumer protection20. At that time, 
the Hong Kong Legislative Council 
took the view that it was premature 
to set up a UK-type Financial 
Ombudsman for fear of increasing 
the operating costs of the industry 
and the possibility of abuse.21 In 
fact, countries such as Australia, 
Singapore, the UK and the US have 
all set up similar bodies since the 
1980s, covering banking, insurance 
and financial planning. Having 
regard to the complexity of financial 
activities in Hong Kong, the level 
of investor grievances and growing 
support from different sectors, such 
as the Law Society, HKIAC, the 
Consumer Council and Legislative 
Councillors, it is high time for Hong 
Kong to catch up with other global 
financial centres in financial dispute 
resolution.22 In the long run, it is in 
the interest of Hong Kong’s reputation 
to set up a FDRC to attract potential 
investors from around the globe and 
assure them of the city’s ability to 
provide world-class financial dispute 
resolution services.
The Scheme 
principally served to 
resolve disputes that 
arose from the under-
regulation of sales by 
banks of particular 
high-risk financial 
products. Without 
proper government 
regulation, however, 
the root of the problem 
remains and a similar 
situation may arise in 
the future.
FDRC: contentious issues
The arguments for establishing a 
FDRC in Hong Kong are compelling 
to many. There are, however, three 
particular issues that have aroused 
debate.
(i) Is the cap for compensation too 
low?
The Consultation Paper proposes that 
the FDRC would handle financial 
disputes up to a maximum of 
HK$500,000.23 The Government has 
stated that the proposed maximum 
claimable amount would cover 
more than 80% of monetary disputes 
currently handled by the HKMA.24 
Critics, however, have said that the 
cap is too low to protect investors. For 
example, Phillip Khan, vice-chairman 
of the Alliance of Lehman Products 
Victims, has said – 
 “The limit does not make sense 
because even many ordinary 
people in Hong Kong have 
investments or assets worth $1M 
or $5M… the claim  should be at 
least HK$5M”.25
This criticism is fair and reasonable. 
Limits of claim in the UK and 
Australia are, by contrast, £100,000 
(HK$1,150,000) and A$280,000 
(HK$1,960,000) respectively, which 
makes Hong Kong’s proposed limit 
of HK$500,000 lag far behind. Even 
if past figures do suggest that the 
proposed amount would be able to 
cover most of the cases, it would be 
more appropriate for a new Hong 
Kong standard to follow international 
benchmarks. Only by doing so can 
Hong Kong continue to develop 
both as an international financial 
services centre and as a regional 
financial dispute resolution centre 
that is capable of dealing effectively 
with disputes involving far larger 
amounts.
(ii) Should a UK-type Financial 
Ombudsman be adopted?
The proposed FDRC would not have 
powers of investigation, by contrast 
with the UK Financial Ombudsman 
Service (FOS), which has powers 
both to investigate and to award 
compensation26. It is submitted that 
the FOS system is not appropriate 
for adoption in Hong Kong because 
“
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it would lead to a complex and 
duplicatory regime of regulation. 
The Law Society of Hong Kong has 
expressed similar concerns about 
duplication of powers27. Retaining 
the powers of the HKMA and SFC to 
deal with regulatory breaches while 
introducing a Financial Ombudsman 
with similar powers would very 
likely confuse or even jeopardize the 
effective division of responsibility in 
financial dispute resolution.
(iii) Should insurance product claims 
be excluded from the FDRC scheme?
The FDRC scheme would not handle 
complaints against products by 
insurance companies because such 
complaints are already dealt with by 
the Insurance Complaints Bureau.28 
This exclusion of jurisdiction initially 
appears reasonable. In the light of 
common cross-selling practices 
in the financial services industry, 
however, the inclusion of insurance 
disputes would go with the prevailing 
trend. It may take some time for such 
a regime to become established, but 
once it does, the existing insurance 
disputes mechanism could be 
removed. A unitary dispute resolution 
mechanism (such as the FDRC) to 
oversee all financial disputes would 
be desirable.
Conclusion
The Lehman Brothers-related 
Investment Products Dispute 
Resolution Mediation and Arbitration 
Scheme has given much meaningful 
guidance on the future development 
of financial dispute resolution in 
Hong Kong. The Government has 
realised an urgent need to catch up 
with other jurisdictions in providing 
an independent dispute resolution 
mechanism for consumers of financial 
services and thus enhancing Hong 
Kong’s financial competitiveness. 
The consultation period on the 
FDRC proposals having ended, it 
is hoped that the Government will 
consider raising maximum claimable 
amounts by reference to international 
standards. Failing to do so will make 
the scheme uncompetitive. It would 
also be desirable to include insurance 
disputes within the purview of 
the proposed scheme as part of its 
continuing development. 
In the long run, it is in 
the interest of Hong 
Kong’s reputation 
to set up a FDRC 
to attract potential 
investors from around 
the globe and assure 
them of the city’s 
ability to provide 
world-class financial 
dispute resolution 
services. 
Mediation and arbitration will 
undoubtedly continue to gain 
popularity in the resolution of disputes 
in the financial services sector. The 
establishment of the FDRC in Hong 
Kong, which is anticipated in the 
2011 legislative year, will be a good 
start towards a permanent presence 
for ADR in the sector.
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